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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
COMMENTS ON STATED ISSUES 
It appears to the defendants that the only real issue on this 
appeal is whether or not Judge Thorne correctly held as a matter of law that 
the language of the covenant in the deeds to plaintiffs property is clear and 
unambiguous. The other two issues, although discussed separately herein, 
can effectively be merged into this one question. Once the ambiguity matter 
is considered and resolved by the court, the questions of reconsideration by 
the succeeding District Judge and the failure to grant the Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment will be resolved as well. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Plaintiff is the present owner of lots 3 and 4 of the Ellison 
Woods Subdivision in Salt Lake County. Plaintiff brought this action in the 
District Court of Salt Lake County under the Utah Declaratory Judgments 
Act (Utah Code Annotated 78-33-1) against all other owners of property in 
that subdivision seeking to obtain a judgment declaring and decreeing that 
certain restrictive covenants in the original deeds to its own property are 
invalid and unenforceable. (R.l-25) The case was assigned to the 
Honorable William A. Thorne, Jr., then a District Judge in Salt Lake County. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Fourteen of the twenty-four named defendants responded to 
plaintiffs Complaint asserting that the restrictive covenant limiting 
construction on each lot to a single-family dwelling house should be upheld 
and enforced by the court. They also alleged that construction of multiple 
dwellings on the lots in any form would be in violation of that covenant. 
The answer was filed jointly on their behalf, and all of them are represented 
by the same attorney. (R. 71-75) 
During the course of the proceedings, the plaintiff filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment on grounds that the restriction on plaintiffs 
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property was invalid and unenforceable as a matter of law. (R.302-3) 
Plaintiffs supporting memorandum asserts that the language of the covenant 
in its deeds is uncertain and ambiguous and must be construed in favor of 
free and unrestricted use of the property. Plaintiff also argued that the 
covenant is invalid as a matter of law because it has been abandoned by the 
property owners and because changes in the subdivision have rendered the 
covenant valueless. (R.304-326) 
Defendants asserted in their response that the motion should be 
denied because the covenant restricting construction on the lots to a single-
family dwelling house is clear and unambiguous and because the questions 
of abandonment of the covenant and the effect of changes in the subdivision 
are questions of material fact that must be resolved by later trial proceedings. 
(R. 329-346) 
After a lengthy oral argument on these issues, the court entered 
its Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. The order 
includes a ruling by the court that the covenant restricting construction on 
the two lots to single-family dwelling houses is clear and unambiguous and 
is therefore enforceable on its face. The court stated further that the issues 
of abandonment and changes to the neighborhood that may nevertheless 
invalidate the covenants are fact sensitive issues that could not be resolved 
as a matter of law on the facts then before the court. (R.464-5) 
The defendants never filed any dispositive motions in this case, 
and they never claimed that the case could be resolved without a jury trial. 
Upon completion of discovery by the parties, a Pre-Trial Order 
was filed outlining the issues to be tried by the court. These included the 
two factual issues relating to the effect on the covenant of changes in the 
subdivision and the possible abandonment of the restriction. (R. 558-564, 
565-571) 
The first trial began and ended on March 15,2000. A mistrial 
was declared when two of the chosen jurors were disqualified. 
When Judge William A. Thorne, Jr. was appointed to the Utah 
Court of Appeals, the case was re-assigned to Judge Leon Dever for further 
proceedings. He convened a jury trial on November 13,2000, to resolve the 
factual issues of change and abandonment. At the conclusion of plaintiffs 
case, defendants made a Motion For A Directed Verdict. In opposing the 
motion, plaintiffs counsel argued that the issue of the clarity or ambiguity 
of the covenant was a question of fact that should be resolved by the jury. 
(R. 162,164,171) He also argued that Judge Thome's ruling on ambiguity 
was not binding on the succeeding judge and should be reconsidered by him 
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at that point. (R. 176) Judge Dever refused to overturn Judge Thome's 
previous order and proceeded with the trial on the issues of change and 
abandonment. (176) 
At the conclusion of the evidence, defendants renewed their 
Motion for a Directed Verdict. (R. 369) PlaintiflTs counsel again contended 
that the judge should reconsider the ruling on the ambiguity of the deeded 
covenant. (R. 373) Judge Dever again refused to overturn the previous 
order of the court. (R. 379) 
C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The case was submitted to the jury in the form of a Special 
Verdict containing two questions about the effect of certain factors on the 
covenant limiting construction on the two lots in the subdivision. The jury 
decided that the changes in the subdivision had not defeated the purpose of 
the restrictions and had not rendered the covenant valueless. The jury also 
found that the restrictive covenant had not been abandoned. (R. 868-9) 
Based thereon, Judge Dever entered judgment for the defendants on 
March 14, 2001. This Judgment included a declaration that the covenant as 
to construction is valid and enforceable by the other property owners in the 
subdivision. (R. 931-934) 
A few days later, plaintiff made a Motion to Alter or Amend the 
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Judgment seeking a reduction in the award of costs and requesting that the 
court delete a paragraph of the judgment. (R. 950-952) Counsel argued in 
his memorandum that paragraph two of the judgment should be removed 
because of the court's ruling on ambiguity, but no other mention of that 
ruling was made there. The judge granted the reduction of costs and denied 
the other objections to the judgment. (R. 962-3) This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Ellison Woods Subdivision was developed in Salt Lake 
County by Home & Garden Corporation in 1947. (PI. Exh. 3) As platted 
and approved by county officials, the subdivision consisted of 35 lots, all of 
which were sold in some form to the original buyers by 1956. Most of them 
were sold by numbered lot, but lots 23 and 24 were further divided by the 
developer into four smaller parcels and were sold by metes and bounds 
description. (TR. 318-322) 
Each of the deeds issued by the developer upon the sale of 
subdivision property included a restrictive covenant that limited construction 
on that property to "a single-family dwelling house." The portion of the 
covenant that is relevant to this action (lots 3 and 4) reads as follows: 
The grantees, his heirs, successors and assigns will 
not erect or permit to be erected on the lot or lots 
above described and purchased by him any 
building or construction to be used for any purpose 
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other than a one-family dwelling house, excepting 
only a barn, garage and customary outhouses 
(Exhibits 6 & 7) 
In 1997, the plaintiff purchased lots 3 and 4 of the subdivision. 
(TR. 8,15) At that time there was an existing single-family dwelling that 
straddled the property line between the two lots. Plaintiff immediately 
converted the existing residence into a duplex and began renting both units 
to third-parties. (TR. 16) 
While plaintiffs owner was negotiating for the purchase of the 
property, he was advised by several subdivision residents that the ownership 
of the lots was subject to the restrictive covenant referred to herein. (TR. 9, 
11,12,15,16, & 30) Despite the deeded restriction, plaintiff planned to 
construct multiple-family townhouses on the property. (TR. 17,27) 
In light of the opposition to its proposed construction of 
multiple housing units on the property, plaintiff brought this action against 
all other owners of property in the Ellison Woods Subdivision to obtain a 
judgment under Utah Code Annotated 78-33-1 declaring and decreeing that 
the restrictive covenants in its deeds to lots 3 and 4 are invalid and 
unenforceable. (Complaint, R. 1-25) Fourteen defendants responded to the 
Complaint and asserted that the restrictive covenant as to construction 
should be upheld and enforced by the court. (Answer, R. 71-75) 
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During the proceedings the plaintiff made a Motion for 
Summary Judgment, but that motion was denied by the Honorable William 
A. Thorne, Jr. because material facts remained to be resolved by a jury at the 
trial of the case. (R. 464-5 & Hearing TR. 24) The District Judge ruled that 
the language of the covenant restricting construction to a single-family 
dwelling house is clear and unambiguous and is therefore enforceable on its 
face. But the issues of abandonment and changes in the neighborhood were 
factual questions that had to be resolved at a trial. (R. 558-564) 
The case was re-assigned to the Honorable Leon A. Dever 
when Judge Thorne was appointed to serve as an Appellate Judge. Trial 
commenced on November 13, 2000. 
Plaintiff's first witness was its owner and manager Andrew 
Kent Menlove. He testified that he intended to construct several twinhomes 
on the rest of the property and to operate them as rental properties. He owns 
several other companies that do the same thing. (TR. 17, 25, 26) Because of 
the restrictive covenant, his purchase price was reduced by $47,500.00. 
(TR. 30) 
At the conclusion of the evidence in the case and during 
argument on defendants' Motion for a Directed Verdict, plaintiffs counsel 
again raised a question about the ambiguity of the restrictive covenant found 
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in the deeds. (TR. 162) But he asserted that the question of vagueness or 
ambiguity of the covenant should be submitted to the jury as a question of 
fact. (TR. 162,164,171) At this point Judge Dever reviewed the language 
of the covenant and read parts of the Brief filed by the plaintiff in support of 
the earlier Motion for Summary Judgment. (TR. 163) He also reviewed 
Judge Thome's Order denying plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
where the ambiguity question was resolved in favor of the defendants. (TR. 
176) Then he refused to overturn that ruling stating that it was the law of the 
case. (TR. 173,176) He clearly reconsidered Judge Thome's previous 
decision, and then he affirmed it. (TR. 176) 
When the judge was ready to submit the case to the jury, 
plaintiffs attorney again argued the issue concerning the vagueness and 
ambiguity of the restrictive covenant. (TR. 373) Counsel for plaintiff again 
urged the court to submit the question of ambiguity to the jury as a question 
of fact, but the judge again declined to do so. 
The case was submitted to the jury in the form of a Special 
Verdict containing two questions. First, the jury was asked to determine if 
the changes in the subdivision had rendered the covenant valueless. Second, 
the jury was asked to determine if the covenant had been abandoned by its 
residents. The jury answered in the negative on each question. (R. 868-869) 
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Based on the jury verdict, the judge entered a judgment in favor 
ofthe defendants and against the plaintiff, (ft. 931-934) Paragraph two of 
the Judgment stated that the covenant in the deeds to the remaining 
properties in the Ellison Woods Subdivision, including lots 3 and 4 of that 
subdivision, that restricts construction to single-family dwellings remains 
valid and enforceable by the residents thereof. 
Plaintiff countered with a Post-Trial Motion to Alter or Amend 
that Judgment. Plaintiff wanted paragraph two removed from the judgment 
and asked that the court adjust the award of costs. The court granted the 
request for a reduction in the award of costs, but the court denied the other 
relief sought in the motion. (R. 962-963) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
No summary judgment was ever entered by the court in this 
action, either expressly or by implication. In
 0rder to rule on Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Judge Thorne had to decide whether the 
restrictive covenant as to construction in plaintiffs deeds was clear and 
unambiguous or uncertain and ambiguous. Iii accordance with Utah law set 
foith in the cases cited in Point I of this Brief^  the judge correctly ruled as a 
matter of law that the language of the covenant is clear and unambiguous, 
m£iking the covenant enforceable as written. The words "a one-family 
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dwelling house" mean that the buyer of property in the Ellison Woods 
Subdivision can build only one house that is designed to accommodate one 
family and is to be used as a place of residence. The covenant is stated in 
plain and simple English, and the meaning is clear. So is the intent of the 
parties. This is the only reasonable construction that can be applied to the 
words of the covenant. 
When the trial judge was asked to reconsider and change the 
ruling as to ambiguity at the conclusion of the trial, he carefully reviewed 
the language of the covenant and the briefs submitted by counsel in support 
of plaintiffs position. He also heard extensive argument before declaring 
that he would not change the decision of the previous trial judge. Any other 
ruling would have been contrary to Utah law. The question of ambiguity is 
clearly a question of law to be decided by the court. 
Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment was 
properly addressed and resolved by the trial judge. In allowing a reduction 
of the court costs and denying the remainder of the motion, the judge 
correctly followed Utah law and the facts of the case. His declaration that 
the covenants in question are still valid and enforceable was properly 
included in the final judgment. It was designed to determine the ultimate 
rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves. Any 
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further clarification sought by the plaintiff in Point III of this Brief is outside 
of the perimeters of this case and should not be considered by this court. 
POINT NO. I 
THE DISTRICT JUDGE PROPERLY RULED AS 
A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE LANGUAGE 
OF THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT IN THE DEEDS 
TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY IS 
CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS. 
No summary judgment was ever granted in this action by either 
of the Judges who handled the case on a District Court level. A Motion for 
Summary Judgment was made by the plaintiff prior to trial, but that motion 
was denied by the Honorable William A. Thome, Jr. because "material facts 
remained to be resolved by a jury at the trial of the case." See Order 
Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. (R.464-5 and Hearing 
TR. p.24) A four-day trial commenced on November 13, 2000, to resolve 
those issues of fact. See Pre-Trial Order (R.558-564). 
Plaintiff contended in support of the Motion for Summary 
Judgment that the language of the covenant in question is unclear and 
ambiguous requiring that it be strictly construed in favor of free and 
unrestricted use of the property. This claim required the court to resolve the 
question of ambiguity before making a final ruling on the motion. Judge 
Thorne determined as a matter of law that the language of the covenant was 
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clear and unambiguous and was therefore enforceable on its face. He also 
ruled that the issues of abandonment and changes in the neighborhood which 
may possibly invalidate the covenants were fact sensitive issues that could 
not be resolved as a matter of law. 
In arguing on this appeal that Judge Thorne in effect granted a 
Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of the defendants when he ruled that 
the covenant restricting construction to a single-family dwelling house was 
clear and unambiguous, the plaintiff has misconceived some of the facts and 
has failed to give proper deference to the rulings made by the District Court. 
The ruling on ambiguity was necessary before the court could properly 
resolve the issues raised by plaintiffs own Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The ruling also defined the issues to be addressed at the trial and enabled 
counsel for the parties to prepare their case presentations to meet and resolve 
those issues. 
The Rules of Construction applied to Deeds of Conveyance are 
outlined in the Utah case of Capital Assets Financial Services v. Lindsay. 
956 P.2d 1090 (1998), where the Utah Court of Appeals stated as follows: 
Deeds are construed according to ordinary rules of 
contract construction. See Homer v. Smith. 866 
P.2d 622,629 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), see also 
Gillmor v. Cummings. 904 P.2d 703,706 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1995). If the deed terms are clear and 
unambiguous, we interpret them according to their 
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plain and ordinary meaning, and parol evidence is 
generally not admissible to vary the terms. See 
Hartman v. Potter. 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 
1979); GiUmor, 904 P.2d at 706. "If the [deed] is 
in writing and the language is not ambiguous, the 
intention of the parties must be determined from 
the words of the agreement." Winegar v. Froerer 
Corp. 813 P.2d 104,110 (Utah 1991). "A court 
may only consider extrinsic evidence if, after 
careful consideration, the contract language is 
ambiguous or uncertain." 
Further instructions concerning deed construction are given in 
the recent case of Swenson v. Erickson. 998 P.2d 807 (Utah 2000), where 
the Supreme Court stated as follows: 
Restrictive covenants that run with the land and 
encumber subdivision lots form a contract between 
subdivision property owners as a whole and 
individual lot owners; therefore, interpretation of 
the covenants is governed by the same rules of 
construction as those used to interpret contracts . . . 
Generally, unambiguous restrictive covenants 
should be enforced as written. However, where 
restrictive covenants are susceptible to two or 
more reasonable interpretations, the intention of 
the parties is ascertained from the document itself 
and the language used within the document. See 
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc. 752 P.2d 892, 
895 (Utah 1988). 
Whether ambiguity exists in the contract is a question of law. 
See Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991), where the 
Supreme Court summarized the rules of interpretation as follows: 
20 
In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the 
parties are controlling. John Call Eng'g Inc. v. 
Manti City Corp.. 743 P.2d 1205,1207 (Utah 
1987). If the contract is in writing and the 
language is not ambiguous, the intention of the 
parties must be determined from the words of the 
agreement... A court may only consider 
extrinsic evidence if, after careful consideration, 
the contract language is ambiguous or uncertain. 
Faulkner v. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1292,1293 
(Utah 1983). A contract provision is ambiguous if 
it is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of "uncertain meanings of 
terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies." 
Id; see also Mann v. Wetter. 100 Or.App.184, 785 
P.2d 1064,1067 (1990). Whether ambiguity exists 
in a contract is a question of law. Faulkner. 665 
P.2datl293. 
See also Plateau Mining v. Utah Division of State Lands. 802 
P.2d 720 (Utah 1990); Cecala v. Thorlev. 764 P.2d 643 (Ut.App. 1998); and 
Parrish v. Richards. 336 P.2d 122, 8 Ut.2d 419 (Utah 1959). 
To summarize, it appears that the question of ambiguity is to be 
decided by the court as a matter of law. If the court decides that the 
covenant is clear and unambiguous, the covenant should be enforced as 
written. If the language is uncertain or ambiguous, then the intent of the 
parties should be ascertained from the language used in the document itself, 
with extrinsic evidence to be limited to prove the purpose and intent of the 
parties. But only in the construction of uncertain or ambiguous restrictions 
21 
will the court resolve all doubts in favor of free and unrestricted use of 
property. 
In the case now before the court, the language of the restrictive 
covenant is essentially the same in both deeds to the two lots purchased by 
the plaintiff in 1997. The relevant portions read as follows: 
"The grantee, his heirs, successors and assigns will not erect 
or permit to be erected on the lot or lots above described and 
purchased by him any building or construction to be used for 
any purpose other than a one family dwelling house, excepting 
only a barn, garage and the customary outhouses, and that no 
dwelling house shall be erected or permit to be erected on said 
lot or lots which shall cost less than $1,000.00. And that a 
dwelling house costing less than $5,000.00 shall be set at least 
100 feet back from the street frontline. All dwelling houses 
built on front 100 feet of said lot or lots shall cost at least 
$5,000.00 and shall be set back at least 20 feet from front line 
of lot. And all outbuildings such as coops, sheds, privies, etc., 
and not including garages attached to house shall be set back at 
least 125 feet from the street frontline. 
It seems clear from the above language that the purpose of the 
construction allowed on the two lots purchased by the plaintiff must be 
limited to (1) a one family dwelling house, or (2) a barn, or (3) a garage, or 
(4) the customary outhouses. The only part of this language that would raise 
any question about clarity are the words "a one family dwelling house." 
Once the meaning of those words is determined, the ambiguity of the 
covenant is resolved. 
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Even a cursory examination of that phrase reveals that the 
construction is limited to "a house." The word "house" is used here as a 
noun. In this context the word "a" means "one" and limits the number of 
houses to be placed on each lot. 
The words "one family dwelling" are adjectives that describe 
the type of house that is allowed on the property. So the buyer can build one 
house that is designed to accommodate one single family. The word 
"dwelling" does not change or obscure the type or nature of the construction. 
It merely limits the use of the house to a place where people live, as 
contrasted to a place where they work or worship or carry on some kind of 
business. 
This covenant is stated in plain and simple English, and the 
meaning is clear. If you buy this property you can build one house that 
provides a place for one family to live. Duplexes, apartments, 
condominiums, and other buildings whose purpose it is to house more than 
one family on the lot in question would violate the restriction. The meaning 
is unambiguous, and so is the intent of the parties to the deed. The District 
Court so held, and that holding should be affirmed by the court. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held in an earlier case dealing 
with restrictive covenants that the language of the covenant is to be taken in 
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its ordinary, general and popular sense and is not to be subjected to technical 
refinement nor words torn from their association and their separate meanings 
sought in a lexicon, as the plaintiff has done in his appeal brief. See 
Freeman v. Gee. 423 P.2d 155 (Utah 1967). 
In Swenson v. Erickson. cited above, the court was dealing with 
a similar covenant that limited construction to "one single family dwelling." 
The court held that the most reasonable interpretation of the covenant is that 
it prohibits the erection of a large workshop on the premises. 
The Supreme Court of Utah discussed and defined some of the 
principles to be applied to the ambiguity question in Plateau Mining v. Utah 
Division of State Lands, supra. The language of the court reads as follows: 
A contract provision is not necessarily ambiguous 
just because one party gives that provision a 
different meaning than another party does. 
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.. 752 P.2d 
892, 895 (Utah 1988). To demonstrate ambiguity, 
the contrary positions of the parties must each be 
tenable. See, e.g.. Grow v. Marwick Dev.. Inc.. 
621 P.2d 1249,1252, (Utah 1980). Even if a 
provision is not "immediately capable of definitive 
determination," that does not necessarily make the 
provision unenforceable. 
Plaintiff argues that the restriction in the deed allows him to 
place as many single-family dwellings on each lot that he can fit there, as 
long as each unit houses only one family. This argument really tortures the 
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true meaning of the stated restriction, and it doesn't make much sense. This 
interpretation could be used to extend construction on the property to include 
all kinds of multiple-family structures, as long as only one family resided in 
each unit. The intention of the grantor leaves no room for such an 
interpretation. In this instance, the covenant was inserted in the deed to keep 
out the duplexes, apartment houses, condominiums, and other business-
oriented types of construction. The intent of the grantor was to retain the 
one-family basic residential integrity of the neighborhood. The placing of 
more than one house on the lot would violate the provision set forth in the 
deed. 
Other state courts have had occasion to construe similar 
covenants. See Walker v. Haslett (1919) 44 Cal App 394,186 P 622, where 
the court recognized that where a restriction is to "a" private residence, in 
the singular, not the plural, such a covenant forbids the erection on the 
premises of more than one dwelling house or residence, and therefore 
prohibits the construction of a double house. 
A restriction placed in deeds to lots in a subdivision, fixing a 
building line and providing that "no building was to be erected on any of the 
lots other than a private dwelling house designed to be occupied by one 
family only," was held by the court in Hoffman v. Schwan (1941) 312 111 
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App 160, 38 NE2d 53, to be intended to limit the number of private dwelling 
houses on a lot to one. Therefore the court ruled that the defendants could 
not subdivide their lot and construct another building on part of the 
subdivision. 
Construing a covenant which prohibited the erection of any 
building other than for the purpose or use of "a" private dwelling, the court 
in Skillman v. Smathehurst (1898) 57 NJ eq 1,40 A 855, rejected the 
contention that a flat or apartment house being constructed fit within the 
terms of the covenant because the flat was a number of private dwellings 
built one upon another, finding that the restriction was to "a private 
dwelling," in the singular, not to a building of private dwellings, in the 
plural. 
Although the defendants strongly disagree with the meaning, 
interpretation, inferences and provability of the testimony of witnesses about 
the ambiguity of the covenant, none of that testimony is important here. The 
question of ambiguity is to be determined by the court as a matter of law 
from the language of the restriction, and the opinions and actions of 
witnesses relating to this question are of no consequence. 
The same can be said about comments of counsel. In every jury 
trial conducted in this state, the trial judge instructs the jury that comments 
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of counsel are not evidence. Plaintiff's reliance on such comments in its 
appeal brief should be totally disregarded by the court. 
Plaintiff challenges the use in the covenant of the word 
"family" arguing that the word might include extended family members. 
The usual, plain meaning of the word "family" is used to describe a typical 
group consisting of a father, mother and children. That is the construction 
that should be used by the court in this case. 
Plaintiff also contends that the use of the words "lot or lots" 
makes the covenant ambiguous. A simple reading of the entire wording of 
the covenant removes any doubt that the terms are used to describe existing 
property in the Ellison Woods Subdivision, and the type of construction 
placed thereon. 
Under plaintiff's interpretation of the words "single family 
dwelling" the owner of a lot could construct any number of family units on 
the lot in any form and still argue that each unit satisfies the requirement of 
"single family dwelling." This could include a ten-story apartment house, 
duplexes, condos or anything else. This interpretation doesn't make any 
sense. Why even have the covenant at all if this were the true meaning of 
the language in the deeds to plaintiff's property. 
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POINT NO. II 
JUDGE DEVER CORRECTLY REFUSED 
TO OVERTURN JUDGE THORNE'S RULING 
ON THE AMBIGUITY OF THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT 
IN THE DEEDS TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY. 
As noted previously in this Brief, plaintiff made a Motion for 
Summary Judgment prior to the trial of this case. In support of that motion 
the plaintiff argued that the covenant restricting construction on its property 
should be construed in favor of free and unrestricted use of the property. 
Before making such an interpretation, the court had to review the language 
of the covenant and determine whether it is clear and unambiguous or 
whether it is uncertain and ambiguous. 
Judge Thorne carefully reviewed the covenant and then ruled 
that the language of the covenant is clear and unambiguous. Based thereon, 
the judge denied plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and ordered that 
the case proceed to trial on factual issues relating to change and 
abandonment. 
At the conclusion of the evidence plaintiffs counsel again 
raised the question about the ambiguity of the covenant found in its deeds. 
But he asserted at that time that the question of vagueness or ambiguity of 
the covenant should be submitted to the jury as a question of fact. At this 
point District Judge Leon Dever reviewed the language of the covenant and 
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read parts of the brief filed by the plaintiff in support of the earlier Motion 
for Summary Judgment. He also reviewed Judge Thome's Order Denying 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment where the ambiguity question was 
resolved in favor of the defendants. Then he refused to overturn that ruling, 
stating that it was the rule of the case. 
Plaintiff claims on this appeal that Judge Dever erroneously 
refused to reconsider Judge Thome's ruling on the question of ambiguity, 
but it appears from the trial transcript that he did in fact reconsider the ruling 
at that time. Then he affirmed it. 
When these circumstances are placed into proper sequence and 
context, it appears that the plaintiff was urging the court to set aside Judge 
Thome's legal ruling on ambiguity and then submit that question to the jury 
as a question of fact. Such action by Judge Dever would have been clearly 
erroneous because the question of ambiguity of a restrictive covenant is a 
question of law. See Faulkner v. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1292,1293 (Utah, 
1983) where the court expressly stated that the question of ambiguity in a 
contract is a legal question to be decided by the court as a matter of law. 
Plaintiffs argument on reconsideration also implies that the 
judge should have changed the ruling made by Judge Thome on the question 
of ambiguity. Since no such change was forthcoming during the trial, the 
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Appellate Court can assume that Judge Dever followed the previous ruling 
and applied it consistently throughout the trial. This brings us back to the 
real issue in this case - whether or not the language of the covenant is clear 
and unambiguous. It appears to the defendants that the issue of 
reconsideration can be effectively merged into the issue discussed in Point I 
of this Brief. 
POINT NO. Ill 
THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD 
AFFIRM THE DENIAL OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ALTER OR 
AMEND THE JUDGMENT. 
The third issue raised by the plaintiff on this appeal concerns 
the trial court's denial of its post-trial Motion to Alter or Amend the 
Judgment. In arguing this part of the appeal, plaintiffs counsel has been 
somewhat creative in describing what the motion was designed to 
accomplish at the trial level. He now claims that the motion was intended to 
obtain "clarification of the covenants" so the plaintiff can determine how to 
best utilize the property. 
In reality, the motion was far more restrictive in scope than the 
plaintiff asserts in its appeal brief. Nothing was said about the clarification 
of the covenants. The plaintiffs Motion raised only one matter that has 
30 
been challenged on this appeal. On pages 3 and 4 of the Memorandum (R. 
953-958) filed in support of the motion, plaintiff argued as follows: 
"Subsequent to the apparent entry of judgment, 
counsel for both parties have also appeared before 
Salt Lake County on a planning and zoning issue. 
At that hearing, defendants' counsel relied upon 
the language of the Judgment in attempting to 
argue an interpretation of the covenants that is 
consistent with the Judgment but which plaintiff 
considers to be inconsistent with the facts as 
asserted by the defendants when they defended 
that action. Based upon the argument presented 
before the Salt Lake County Commission, plaintiff 
has concerns about the Judgment and wishes to 
have paragraph 2 on page 3 of the Judgment 
removed. The finding asserted in that paragraph 
was not determined by the jury and in fact 
mischaracterizes the covenant as it was argued by 
defendants' counsel. In light of the court's ruling 
as a matter of law that the covenants were not 
ambiguous, this portion of the judgment should be 
removed." 
Paragraph 2 on page 3 of the Judgment states as follows: 
"2. The covenant in the deeds to the remaining 
properties in the Ellison Woods Subdivision, including 
lots 3 and 4 of that subdivision, that restricts construction 
to single-family dwellings remains valid and enforceable 
by the residents thereof." 
In asking that this paragraph be removed from the Judgment, 
plaintiff seems to forget what this whole case was about. The Complaint 
asked for a declaratory judgment declaring and decreeing that the restrictive 
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covenant as to construction is void and unenforceable. That relief was 
denied, and the court properly declared that those covenants are still valid 
and enforceable. 
Rule 54(c)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states as follows: 
Except as to a party against whom a judgment is 
entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the 
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in 
his pleading. It may be given for or against one or more 
of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the 
case requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the 
parties on each side as between or among themselves. 
In declaring that the covenant is valid and enforceable the court 
was complying with this rule, and there is no reason to change that 
declaration. 
It now appears that the plaintiff wishes to have some 
clarification of the judgment because of some alleged administrative 
proceedings recently held before the Salt Lake County Commission. Those 
administrative proceedings have no relevance to this case, and what occurred 
there would not have provided any reason to amend the judgment that has 
been entered in this action. 
Plaintiff's attempt to now enlarge the Motion to Alter or 
Amend the Judgment to include a request for clarification is very unfair to 
the District Court. This issue was never raised in the lower court and should 
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not be considered on appeal. See US Express. Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Commission. 886 P.2d 1115 (Utah App. 1994); Olson v. Park-Craig-
Olsonjnc,, 815 P.2d 1356 (Utah App. 1991) 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff unwittingly finds itself in a strange conflict in this 
case. At the trial court level plaintiff made a motion for summary judgment 
where it asserted that the case could be resolved as a question of law. It 
argued that no material facts existed and that the court could resolve the case 
without a trial. But here on this appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial 
court erroneously granted a motion for summary judgment when it decided 
that the language of the covenant is clear and unambiguous. He now asserts 
that there were questions of fact about the ambiguity that should have been 
presented to the jury and that a motion for summary judgment was not 
proper at that time. At the trial court he argued that no questions of fact 
remained to be resolved, and on appeal he argues that questions of fact 
should have been submitted to a jury. This argument seems inconsistent at 
best. 
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For reasons stated herein, the court should affirm the judgment 
of the trial court on this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
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LINCOLN W. HOBBS, Esq. #4848 
LINCOLN W. HOBBS, L.C. 
P.O. BOX 1560 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84110-1560 
(801) 575-6594 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOLLADAY DUPLEX MANAGEMENT ) 
COMPANY, L.L.C., a Utah Limited ) PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR 
Liability Company; ) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
DALE G. HOWELLS and LOIS HOWELLS, ) 
TRUSTEES of the HOWELLS FAMILY TRUST ) 
U/A/D 6/17/91; JACK M. MONSON and ) Civil No. 980901408 
D ARLENE L. MONSON, TRUSTEES of the ) 
MONSON FAMILY TRUST U/A/D 11/6/91; ) 
MARION G. COX AND MARY E. COX; ) 
ALBERT R. PEARCE; HELEN ELIZABETH ) 
MORGAN OLSEN, TRUSTEE of the HELEN ) 
ELIZABETH MORGAN OLSEN REVOCABLE ) 
LIVING TRUST AGREEMENT; CHARLES L. ) 
SUMMERS and CAROLE A. SUMMERS; ) 
ROBERT C.BRADY AND ELSIE I. BRADY; ) 
MICHAEL A. SLEATER and DEANNA A. ) 
SLEATER; ERMA L. LARSEN; RHETT and ) 
V. ANN MILLER, TRUSTEES of the V. ANN ) 
MILLER LIVING TRUST; DELORES ) 
RASMUSSEN; and ELLIOT J. WINTCH and ) 
ATHELENE E. WINTCH; ) 
Defendants. ) Judge William A. Thorne 
Plaintiff hereby moves the Court, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56. for a Summary 
Judgment ruling, as a matter of law, that the restrictions on the plaintiffs property are invalid and 
unenforceable. Alternatively, plaintiff requests a ruling, as a matter of law, that the plaintiffs 
proposed construction of luxury twinhomes does not violate the covenants alleged to encumber 
the plaintiffs property. 
This Motion is supported by a memorandum of points and authorities submitted herewith. 
DATED this 5 day of April, 1999. 
LINepLN W. HOBBS, Esq.' 
X>LN W. HOBBS, L.C. 
for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment to be mailed, postage prepaid, this 5 day of April, 1999, to: 
H. Ralph Klemm, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendants 
489 West 3500 South 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
3686\.motion 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HOLLADAY DUPLEX MANAGEMENT COMPANY, 
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE G. HOWELLS AND LOIS HOWELLS, 
Trustees of the Howells Family Trust 
U/A/D, June 17, 1991, et al.# 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No.: 980901408 
Judge William A. Thorne 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment came before this Court 
for oral argument on June 30, 1999. Plaintiff was present and 
represented by its attorney of record, Lincoln W. Hobbs. Defendants 
were present and represented by their counsel of record, H. Ralph 
Klemm. This Court, having heard argument and reviewed the Briefs of 
both parties has determined that Material Pacts Remain to be Resolved 
by a Jury at a Trial of this Case. 
THIS COURT HEREBY ORDERS: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
2. This Court rules that the non-discriminatory covenants in 
the deeds to lots 3 and 4 of the Ellison Woods Subdivision 
the restricting construction to single family dwellings are 
clear and unambiguous and therefore enforceable on its 
face. 
However, issues of abandonment or changes to the 
nature of the neighborhood that may invalidate the 
covenants are fact sensitive issues and are not, as a 
matter of law, subject to a decision on the facts presently 
before this Court. 
Additionally, all covenants included in the deed that 
restrict access to the property on the basis of race are 
struck down as invalid. 
All additional Motions are to be filed with the Court by 
October 8, 1999. 
Discovery is to be concluded by September 3, 1999. 
Following discovery it is the responsibility of counsel to 
inform the clerk when the parties are ready for trial. 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 980901408 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail LINCOLN W HOBBS 
ATTORNEY DEF 
341 South Main Street 
Felt Building, Suite 208 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Mail LINCOLN W HOBBS 
ATTORNEY PLA 
341 South Main Street 
Felt Building, Suite 208 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Mail H. RALPH KLEMM 
ATTORNEY DEF 
489 WEST 3500 SOUTH 
BOUNTIFUL, UT 84010 
Dated this 1L day of S^jpktviitA. ™99L;^^ 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HOLLADAY DUPLEX MANAGEMENT 
COMPANY, L.L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Plaintiff, 
DALE G. HO WELLS and LOIS HO WELLS, 
TRUSTEES of the HO WELLS FAMILY 
TRUST U/A/D 06/17/91; JACK M. 
MONSON and DARLENE L. MONSON, 
TRUSTEES of the MONSON FAMILY 
TRUST U/A/D 11/06/91; MARION G. COX 
and MARY E. COX; ALBERT R. PEARCE; 
HELEN ELIZABETH MORGAN OLSEN, 
TRUSTEE of the HELEN ELIZABETH 
MORGAN OLSEN REVOCABLE LIVING 
TRUST AGREEMENT; CHARLES L. 
SUMMERS and CAROLE A. SUMMERS; 
ROBERT C. BRADY and ELSIE 1. BRADY; 
MICHAEL A. SLEATER and DEANNA A. 
SLEATER; ERMA L. LARSEN; RHETT 
and V. ANN MILLER, TRUSTEES of 
the V. ANN MILLER LIVING TRUST; 
DELORES RASMUSSEN; and ELLIOTT J. 
WINTCH and ATHELENE E. WINTCH, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Civil No. 980901408 PR 
Judge Leon A. Dever 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions. If you find the evidence clearly and convincingly 
established the issue presented, answer "Yes." If you fmdthe evidence is so equally balanced 
that you cannot determine by clear and convincing evidence, or if you find the evidence is 
against the issue presented, answer "No." 
At least six of you must agree on the answer to each question before this verdict form is 
completed, but all of the jurors do not need to agree on each of the questions. 
1. Have there been changes in the Ellison Woods Subdivision that are so significant 
that they I) neutralize the benefits of the restrictions to the point of defeating their purpose, or 
2) have the changes been of such a nature that they render the covenant valueless? 
ANSWER: Yes No ^ ( 
2. Has the restrictive covenant in the deeds to the Ellison Woods Subdivision prop-
erties been abandoned? 
ANSWER: Yes No ^ 
DATED this / k day of November, 2000. 
Foreperson 
H. RALPH KLEMM 
Attorney for Defendants 
Bar No. 1838 
489 West 3500 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 ^ , „ . _ 
Telephone: (801)295-0718 _ _ A g J) t-f j 0 ) 
POLES SOTEST GGSRT 
Third Judicial District 
K 
r-..T^RE£'j».;n^y . . . SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Dopuiy Cl«ik 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUIHTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOLLADAY DUPLEX 
MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC. 
A UTAH UMITEDLIABILrrY COMPANY, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS.. 
DALE G. HOWELLS AND LOIS HOWELLS, 
TRUSTEES of the HOWELLS FAMILY 
TRUST U/A/D 06/17/91; JACK M. 
MONSON and DARLENE MONSON, 
TRUSTEES of the MONSON FAMILY 
TRUST U/A/D 11/06/91; MARION G. COX 
and MARY E. COX; ALBERT R PEARCE; 
HELEN ELIZABETH MORGAN OLSEN, 
TRUSTEE of the HELEN ELIZABETH 
MORGAN OLSEN REVOCABLE LIVING 
TRUST AGREEMENT; CHARLES L. 
SUMMERS, and CAROLE A. SUMMERS; 
ROBERT C. BRADY and ELSIE I. BRADY; 
MICHAEL A SLEATER and DEANNA A 
SLEATER; ERMA L LARSEN; RHETT 
and V. ANN MILLER, TRUSTEES of 
the V. ANN MILLER LIVING TRUST; 
DELORES RASMUSSEN; and ELLIOTT J. 
WINTCH and ATHELENE E. WINTCH, 
DEFENDANTS. 
JUDGMENT 
CIVIL NO 980901408 PR 
JUDGE LEON DEVER 
The above action came before the Court for Trial on November 
13,2000. The plaintiff and the defendants contesting this case were present in 
court and were represented by their respective attorneys of record. The Court 
impaneled a jury of eight persons to try the factual issues of the case and then 
received evidence in documentary form and from witnesses called to testify on 
behalf of flie parties. At the conclusion of the evidence, the court submitted 
the Issues of Fact to the jury in the form of a Special Verdict, and the jury 
answered the questions in the Special Verdict as follows: 
1. Have there been changes in the Ellison Woods Subdivision 
that are so significant that they 1) neutralize the benefits of the restrictions to 
the point of defeating their purpose, or 2) have the changes been of such a 
nature that they render (he covenant valueless? 
ANSWER: Yes No_X 
2. Has the restrictive covenant in the deeds to the Ellison Woods 
Subdivision properties been abandoned? 
ANSWER: Yes No _X 
NOW, THEREFORE, in accordance with the verdict rendered by 
the jury herein, and good cause appearing therefor, 
2 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND OECREED as 
follows: 
1. In accordance with the prior ruling of the court, the covenant 
included in the deeds to the properties in the Ellison Woods Subdivision that 
restricts access to the property on the basis of race is struck down as invalid 
and unenforceable. 
2. The covenant in the deeds to the remaining properties in the 
Ellison Woods Subdivision, including Lots 3 and 4 of that subdivision, that 
restricts construction to single family dwellings remains valid and enforceable 
by the residents thereof. 
3. In all other respects, the plaintiffs Complaint and this action 
for declaratory relief against the defendants are dismissed with prejudice. 
4. Pursuant to the Court's Minute Entry decision of February 21, 
2001, Defendants' Motion for an Award of Attorney's Fees is denied. 
5. Defendants are awarded judgment for costs of court in the sum 
of $779.36. 
6. Interest shall accrue on the Judgment for costs and attorney's 
fees in accordance with Utah law until paid in full. 
3 
f) davof V V W . , DATED this V) y  V T O \ y N — . ,2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the JUDGMENT 
was served on counsel listed below, this / day of . 2001 to 
the counsel listed below. 
Lincoln W. Hobbs, Esq. 
HOBBS, ADONDAKIS & OLSON, L.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Felt Building, Suite 208 
341 So. Main Street 
SaltLakeCity, Utah 84111 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HOLLADAY DUPLEX MANAGEMENT CO, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs 
DALE G HOWELLS, 
Defendan t 
RULING ON PLAINTIFF 'S MOTION TO 
ALTER OR AMEND 
C a s e No: 9 8 0 9 0 1 4 0 8 
J u d g e : L . A. DEVER 
D a t e : 0 4 / 1 3 / 2 0 0 1 
C l e r k : k a t h r y n b 
The D e f e n d a n t s ' O b j e c t i o n t o t h e c o s t s t a x e d i n t h i s c a s e i s w e l l 
t a k e n . T h e amount of c o s t s awarded i s $ 1 1 4 . 0 0 The r e m a i n i n g 
c l a i m e d a m o u n t i s d i s a l l o w e d . A l l o t h e r o b j e c t i o n s b y t h e 
P l a i n t i f f a r e d e n i e d . 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 980901408 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail LINCOLN W HOBBS 
ATTORNEY PLA 
341 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
FELT BUILDING, SUITE 208 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Mail H. RALPH KLEMM 
ATTORNEY DEF 
489 WEST 3500 SOUTH 
BOUNTIFUL, UT 84010 
Dated this J2L* day of /fyjiJl, , 20 Of . 
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